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NOTES
The Specific Incident Exemption of the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act: Deceptively Straightforward
I. Introduction
Employee theft has reached epidemic proportions in the United
States with estimated losses ranging from $9.2 billion to $50 billion per
year.' A recent survey showed that at least one-third of retail manufac-
turing and service organization employees have stolen company prop-
erty.2 Others have estimated that "seventy percent of all workers steal
something during the course of their employment. ' 3 In 1982, approxi-
mately 335,000 American workers were arrested for theft from their em-
ployers even though "discipline, not arrest, is the normal consequence"
of employee theft. 4
Employers have attacked this epidemic, in part, by making wide-
spread use of the polygraph.5 In recent years, employers have conducted
approximately two million polygraph examinations annually6 to screen
job applicants, investigate specific instances of employee theft, and un-
cover employee misconduct. 7 However, objections to employer use of
the polygraph have been raised on the grounds that experts have not
agreed on the polygraph's ability to detect deception8 and polygraph ex-
aminers frequently ask needlessly intrusive questions. 9
1 D. LYKEEN, A TREMOR IN THE BLOOD 185 (1981). See also Staff Report, To Catch a Thief. Stealing
in the Workplace Studied, 70 A.B.A. J. Apr. 1984, at 38 (quoting a three year study by the National
Institute ofJustice entitled "Theft by Employees in Work Organizations" which estimated employee
theft at between $5 billion and $10 billion per year).
2 See Staff Report, supra note 1, at 38.
3 Nagle, The Polygraph in the Workplace, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 43, 63 (1983).
4 Id.
5 For a basic introduction to the polygraph and polygraph testing, see infra text accompany
notes 17-42.
6 See Polygraph Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 1815 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986) (opening statement of Sen. Hatch). It has also been
reported that 30% of Fortune 500 companies and over 50% of retail businesses use the polygraph.
H.R. REP. No. 416, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985). A study also reported that 50% of commercial
banks, fast food restaurants, and retailers use polygraphs. Belt & Holden, Polygraph Usage Among
Major U.S. Corporations, PERSONNELJ., Feb. 1978, at 80-86. The use of lie detectors has increased
rapidly in recent years. A study conducted in 1977 estimated that only 300,000 people were given
polygraph tests in 1974. See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN IN-
FORMATION SOCIETY (1977).
7 See Tiner & O'Grady, Lie Detectors in Employment, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 85 (1988).
8 A witness at a Senate Committee hearing estimated that annually 400,000 innocent employees
are labeled deceptive and suffer adverse employment decisions as a result. See S. REP. No. 284, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 41, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 726, 729 [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT].
9 For example, Adolf Coors Brewery required employees to answer the following questions:
"Are you a Communist?" "Have you ever been involved with homosexuals?" "Have you ever par-
ticipated in a march or riot or demonstration?" "How much do you owe on your home?" "Is there
anything that you know of for which you could be blackmailed?" D. LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 3.
In response to these objections, forty-one states enacted regulations
governing polygraph use. These state laws lacked uniformity, however,
and were often circumvented by employers who could easily require em-
ployees to submit to polygraph tests in neighboring states with less strin-
gent regulations. 10 As a result, after the introduction of nearly fifty bills
limiting polygraph use over a period of at least twenty years, Congress
passed the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 198811 ("EPPA" or
"the Act").
The Act prohibits the use of lie detectors 12 for pre-employment
screening or random testing' 3 by most employers engaged in interstate
commerce.14 These employers may now only use the polygraph to inves-
tigate "specific incidents" of "economic loss."' 5 Employers wishing to
conduct tests under this "specific incident" exemption are faced with a
maze of requirements and a serious risk of liability. 16 This Note exam-
ines the specific incident exemption of the Act. Part I gives an introduc-
tion to polygraph testing in the private-sector and considers the issue of
polygraph validity. Part II provides an overview of the Act and its legisla-
tive history and puts the specific incident exemption into context. Part
III focuses on the requirements of the specific incident exemption and
attempts to clarify when employers may conduct polygraph examinations
under this exemption. In addition, Part III suggests that courts should
broadly construe the exemption in order to permit employers' use of the
polygraph as an investigative tool.
II. Polygraph Methodology and Validity
A. Introduction to the Polygraph and Private-sector Examination Techniques
Polygraph examiners conduct exams by asking the subject a series of
questions designed to elicit triggering responses. 17 The modem poly-
graph measures the subject's blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and gal-
vanic skin responses throughout the examination.18 Polygraph validity is
premised on the assumption that lying produces physiological responses
10 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 731.
11 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2001-2009 (West Supp. 1988).
12 "The term 'lie detector' includes a polygraph, deceptograph, voice stress analyzer, psycholog-
ical stress evaluator, or any other similar device (whether mechanical or electrical) that is used, or the
results of which are used, for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or
dishonesty of an individual." Id. § 2001(3).
13 lId
14 Id. § 2002. Under the Act, the term "commerce" has the meaning provided by section 3(b) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. It § 2001(1). Under this definition, approximately 5.7 mil-
lion businesses and 94 million employees and job applicants will be affected by the Act.
15 Id. § 2006(d).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 132-61 for a discussion of the requirements of testing under
the specific incident exception and a discussion of potential liability for employers conducting poly-
graph tests.
17 SeeJ. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE DECTOR") TECHNIQUE,
3 (1966). See text accompanying notes 30-42 for a discussion of questions that might be asked dur-
ing a relevant/irrelevant test or a control question test.
18 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING: A RE-
SEARCH REVIEW AND EVALUATION-A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM (1983) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
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which the polygraph can measure.1 9 However, other factors, such as ex-
aminer competence, may affect the outcome of the polygraph test.20
There are three phases to a polygraph test-a pretest interview, the
test, and a posttest interview. 21 During the pretest interview, the exam-
iner explains the test procedure and previews questions that will be
asked during the inquiry.22 This phase of the test provides an opportu-
nity for the examiner to condition the subject for the examination and
observe helpful indications of guilt.23 In the testing phase, the examiner
typically asks a series of questions several times, often pausing 15-20
seconds between questions, and records the answers and question num-
bers directly on the polygraph test chart. 24 Finally, in the posttest phase,
the examiner discusses the results of the test with the subject and may
ascertain other possible explanations for distorted physiological re-
sponses if the test results indicated deception. 25
Polygraph examiners use at least six different questioning meth-
ods.2 6 However, the two methods which are used most often in the em-
ployment context are the relevant/irrelevant test and the control
question test. Examiners typically choose among the methods based on
their own experience and the situation at hand;27 however, the decision
is usually driven by the situation at hand. For example, the relevant/
irrelevant test is used for most preemployment screening and random
testing,28 while the control question method is used for most investiga-
tions of specific incidents of wrongdoing. 29
19 Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 699-
700 (1961).
20 See infra text accompanying notes 77-78. The competence and experience of the examiner is
the most important factor affecting the reliability of the polygraph examination. See F. INBAU & J.
REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 5 (1953); Note, The Polygraph Protection Act of
1985: Bobbing Pinocchio' New Nose?, 43 WAsn. & LEE L. REV. 1411, 1414 (1986). Other factors that
could affect the polygraph test results include:
1. Nervousness or extreme emotional tension caused by the fact that an accusation has been
leveled against the subject;
2. Fear that the examination will expose information unconnected to the investigation;
3. Anger or resentment over having to take a lie-detector test;
4. Physiological abnormalities such as high or low blood pressure, respiratory disorders or
heart disease;
5. Drug use;
6. Level of intelligence or mental disorders; and
7. Lack of fear of exposure through the polygraph.
See F. INBAU &J. REID, supra, at 67; Gardner, Wiretapping the Mind: A Call to Regulate Truth Verification in
the Workplace, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 303 (1984); Hurd, Use of Polygraph in ScreeningJob Applicants,
22 AM. Bus. L.J. 527, 530-31 (1985).
21 See OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 12.
22 SeeJ. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 17, at 10-16.
23 Id. at 10. The examiner "conditions" a subject in the pre-test interview by persuading him/
her that the examination will be "professionally conducted and that any deception attempted 'will be
very obvious to the examiner.'" OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 12 (citation omitted).
24 See id. at 17-18; Nagle, The Polygraph in the Workplace, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 43, 55 (1983).
25 Nagle, supra note 24, at 58.
26 D. LYKEEN, supra note 1, at 85. The six methods are the relevant/irrelevant test, the control
question test, the truth control test, the positive control test, the relevant control test, and the
searching peak of tension test. See id. at 103-50 for a detailed discussion of these tests.
27 Id. at 85.
28 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 42. See also Saxe, Dougherty & Cross, The Validity of Polygraph
Testing, 40 AM. PSYCHOLoGIsT 355, 357 (1985).
29 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 42.
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Under the relevant/irrelevant method, the subject is typically asked
relevant questions, preceded and followed by irrelevant questions.8 0 A
relevant question tests the subject's knowledge and involvement in the
case at hand.8 ' In other words, a relevant question is the " 'Did you do
it?' question." 32 An irrelevant question concerns facts that the examiner
knows are true but are unrelated to the matter under investigation.3 3 Ex-
amples of irrelevant questions include: Are you in Baltimore now?, Is
today Tuesday?, Did you have a coat with you today?3 4 Irrelevant ques-
tions are designed "primarily to establish the subject's normal physiolog-
ical responses under test conditions."3 5 The examiner's interpretation
of the subject's physiological response to the relevant questions, when
compared to responses for irrelevant questions, ultimately determines
whether the subject will be evaluated as truthful or deceptive. One ex-
pert summarized this procedure by saying that "[i]f the subject shows a
strong polygraphic reaction to some or all of the relevant questions, but
not to the irrelevant questions, then his answers to the relevant questions
are classified Deceptive."3 6
The control question method differs from the relevant/irrelevant
method in that it attempts to guard against the possibility that some in-
nocent examinees may appear responsive to threatening relevant ques-
tions.3 7 The control question test utilizes questions which are designed
to provide a sample of physiological responses elicited by untruthful an-
swers ("known lies"),38 The subject's reactions to these "control ques-
tions" are compared with those to relevant questions.3 9 If the examinee
is more responsive to the control questions than to the relevant ques-
tions, the answers to the relevant questions are labeled truthful. 40 Con-
versely, if the subject has a greater reaction to the relevant questions, the
relevant answers are scored deceptive. 4 1 If there is a minimal difference
between the subject's reactions to relevant and control questions, the ex-
aminer labels the test results inconclusive. 42
30 D. LyxKEN, supra note 1, at 105.
31 Nagle, supra note 24, at 55.
32 D. LYRREN, supra note 1, at 104.
33 Nagle, supra note 24, at 55.
34 SeeF. INBAU &J. REID, supra note 20, at 17.
35 Nagle, supra note 24, at 55.
36 D. LYKKEN, supra note 1, at 105.
37 Nagle, supra note 24, at 56.
38 D. LYRKEN, supra note 1, at 110-11. For example, an examiner may ask "Before age 19, did
you ever lie to get out of trouble?" Id. at 110. If the subject answers "No", the "examiner privately
assumes that this answer is a lie." Id. at 111. To provide assurance that a "No" response really is
deceptive, Reid and Inbau, who developed the lie control technique, explain that "the examiner
should select as controls only questions to which the subject shows 'behavior symptoms of decep-
tion' (hesitation, breaking eye contact, squirming, etc.)." Id. (citation omitted). But Lykken notes
that "[o]ther examiners simply assume that everyone has done the sorts of things referred to in these
questions and that a 'No' answer must be deceptive." Id.
39 For a hypothetical control question test format, see id. at 110-11.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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B. The Validity of Polygraph Results
For years the center of the debate concerning polygraph use has fo-
cused on the validity of polygraph test results. Numerous studies have
attempted to resolve this issue.43 The purpose of this discussion is not to
show that polygraphs are foolproof lie detectors, but rather to set forth
the results of various studies in order to give an overall impression of
polygraph validity. This data forms the basis for this Note's argument
that courts should broadly construe the specific incident exemption in
order to permit employers to use the polygraph as an investigative tool.
1. Pre-employment Screening and Random Testing
The Act's legislative history shows that there is very little evidence
establishing the validity of polygraph tests conducted for pre-employ-
ment screening or on a random basis. 44 In fact, the little data that exists
"raises serious doubts about the validity of such tests." 45 Since poly-
graph advocates failed to establish the accuracy of the polygraph when
used for pre-employment screening or random testing, Congress prohib-
ited most employers from using polygraphs for either purpose.46
2. Specific Incident Testing
Congress did find "some evidence of validity" when the polygraph is
used to investigate specific instances of misconduct. 47 This evidence of
validity was found, in part, in a 1983 Office of Technology Assessment
Report (OTA Report)48 which reviewed numerous studies on the sub-
ject. Although the OTA Report "concluded that no overall measure or
single simple judgment of polygraph testing validity can be established
based on available scientific evidence,"'49 the Report's summaries of spe-
cific incident studies indicated a fairly low rate of inaccuracy. 50
The OTA Report grouped polygraph validity tests into two catego-
ries-laboratory studies and field studies. Laboratory studies involve re-
search in a controlled environment and may or may not be based on real-
life situations. 5' Certain differences between real-world testing and tests
43 See infra tables accompanying notes 56-76.
44 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 42.
45 Id. at 43. The Senate Report states:
Unlike the control question test, which is based upon a specific issue or fact situation,
the relevant-irrelevant test [which is used for most pre-employment screening or random
testing] tends to be vague and broad, because the examiner is seeking to determine what an
employee or prospective employee may do in the future. Also, these examinations are usu-
ally much shorter in duration than control question tests, and most experts agree that both
factors significantly undercut the potential accuracy of the examination.
Id. at 42-43.
46 See infra note 82.
47 The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources did note, however, that the control
question technique, which is used for most specific incident testing, often yielded false positive re-
sults. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 42.
48 See OTA REPORT, supra note 18.
49 Id. at 3.
50 See charts accompanying notes 56-76 for a summary of polygraph validity studies.
51 The broad category of laboratory studies includes the subcategory of analog studies which are
conducted in the laboratory using "designs that simulate actual testing conditions, such as mock
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conducted in the laboratory have made lie detection in the laboratory
more difficult.52 Since these differences undercut certain basic polygraph
premises, 53 researchers have generally found that polygraph validity is
lower in the laboratory setting as compared to the field situation.54 But
despite these differences, laboratory studies have generally indicated that
lie detectors, when conclusive, 55 are fairly accurate.
Table 1 summarizes results of various laboratory studies considered
in the OTA Report. 56
crimes." S. ABRAMS, THE COMPLETE POLYGRAPH HANDBOOK 254 (1989). The OTA Report only con-
sidered analog laboratory studies.
52 The following differences make lie detection in the laboratory more difficult. First, laboratory
subjects have little or nothing to lose if a lie is detected as opposed to real-life examinees who could
lose their jobs or face imprisonment. Id at 181. Abrams points out that:
[e]ven in analog [laboratory] studies that attempt to simulate actual testing conditions
through the use of mock crimes, the emotions associated with deception are simply not the
same and not of the same degree. Because of this, the examinee does not experience the
same degree of sympathetic arousal that stimulates the physiological reactions that allow for
the detection of lies.
Id. Second, laboratory examiners are often untrained and inexperienced. Id. Finally, control ques-
tion tests conducted in the laboratory have not been as effective because "relevant questions ...
relate to a mock crime that has relatively little meaning for the subject, whereas the control question,
which deals with real personal issues, [may] be [a] threat to the individual's privacy. It would seem,
therefore, that the control question could become more relevant than the relevant item." Id.
53 See supra text accompanying notes 17-42 for a discussion of lie detection methods.
54 See infra charts accompanying notes 56-76.
55 Conclusive, in this context, means that the examiner was able to make a determination (either
correctly or incorrectly) as to whether the examinee's answers were honest or deceptive.
56 The figures in this chart are based on table 6 of the OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 63. In the
studies presented, there were an equal number of "innocent" and "guilty" subjects, i.e., an equal
number of subjects who were told either that they had or had not committed a crime. The "accu-
rate," "inconclusive," and "inaccurate" figures were obtained by averaging the respective "correct,"
"inconclusive," and "incorrect" percentages from the guilty and innocent groups on the OTA Re-
port. The "false positive" and "false negative" percentages are shown as a percentage of the entire
population, i.e., not as a percentage of the guilty and innocent subjects as shown in the OTA Report.
These percentages reflect the overall percentage of false positives that would be obtained in a situa-
tion where half of the population was "guilty" and half "innocent." These percentages would prob-
ably vary if a different percentage of the population were either "guilty" or "innocent."
Several studies considered by the OTA Report were excluded from the present analysis for
various reasons. For example, a study conducted by Szucko & Kleinmuntz, Statistical Versus Clinical
Lie Detection, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIsT 488 (1981), was excluded because examiners were not able to
score the test inconclusive, as they may and often do, in the real world. In addition, the figures from
Honts and Hodes, see infra notes 68-69, regarding subjects who used countermeasures such as
tongue biting and toe pressing were excluded because a significant number of real-life examinees
would not receive training sessions in the use of countermeasures, as was the case in this study.
Finally, a study conducted by Heckel, Brokaw, Salzberg, & Wiggins, Polygraphic Variations in Reactivity
Between Delusional, Nondelusional, and Control Groups in a Crime Situation, 53J. OF CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY
AND POLICE Sci. 380 (1962), was excluded because it measured the validity of the polygraph when
used to test nondelusional and delusional psychiatrics, rather than normal examinees who would
generally be tested in the employment context.
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Table 2 shows that field studies considered by the OTA Report also
yielded fairly high validity percentages. 7'
71 Figures were compiled from data presented on Table 5 in the OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at
53. The studies conducted by Davidson and Raskin, see infra notes 75-76, did not test the same
number of "guilty" and "innocent" subjects and therefore the percentages of "accurate," "inconclu-
sive," and "inaccurate" test results for "guilty" and "innocent" subjects were weighted to obtain
overall "accurate," "inconclusive," and "inaccurate" percentages. Test results which did not report
"inconclusive" results or which did not allow the examiner to reach an inconclusive determination
were excluded for the same reason mentioned, supra note 56, namely that real-life examiners are
allowed to make inconclusive determinations. In addition, a study reported in NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS OF
CRIMINAL SUSPECTS, REPORT No. 76-1 (1976), which used judicial determinations of ground truth
(the establishment of actual guilt or innocence) was excluded because of "the fact that the judicial
outcome is not a highly accurate measure of guilt because of such characteristics of the legal system
as proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prevalence of plea bargaining." OTA REPORT, Supra
note 18, at 56. The portion of Barland and Raskin's study using a panel to determine ground truth
was also excluded on the grounds that
many of the investigative files that were given to the panel were incomplete. The files
had been compiled by inexperienced student assistants who often did not know where to
obtain necessary information. The officials responsible for providing the information were,
more often than not, unavailable or, when they were available, unable to recall the details of
a crime. In many cases few details were available.
Id. at 54.
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Although these figures standing alone are impressive, conclusions
regarding overall polygraph test validity must be carefully drawn.77 The
polygraph test is a very complex process and there are many factors, such
as examiner competence and duration of the test, which could affect its
validity. 78 Congress recognized these factors, though, and included sev-
eral provisions in the Act, such as an examiner licensing provision, to
minimize their effect. 79
II. The Employee Polygraph Protection Act
Since the 1960's, Congress considered, but refused to pass, legisla-
tion restricting private-sector polygraph testing.80 In the 100th Con-
gress, however, the House passed H.R. 1212 which banned private-
sector polygraph testing with two industry exemptions; 81 and the Senate
passed S. 1904 which banned testing where "evidence [of polygraph reli-
ability] indicate[d] a lack of validity" 82 and carefully regulated testing
where "evidence indicate[d] some validity."83 The House of Representa-
tives version eventually was accepted by both Houses after substantial
incorporation of the Senate bil184-including the specific incident
exemption.
77 As the OTA Report pointed out:
[alithough, the instrument is essentially the same for all applications, the types of indi-
viduals tested, training of the examiner, purpose of the test, and types of questions asked,
among other factors, can differ substantially. A polygraph test requires that the examiner
infer deception or truthfulness based upon a comparison of the person's physiological re-
sponses to various questions .... Thus, conclusions about scientific validity can be made
only in the context of specific applications and even then must be tempered by the limita-
tions of available research evidence.
OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 4.
78 See generally, chapter six of the OTA REPORT, supra note 18.
79 See infra text accompanying notes 125-31.
80 "From the 93rd Congress through the 100th, almost 50 bills have been introduced to ban,
restrict, or regulate [polygraph testing]." SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 44. Recently, however,
the House passed H.R. 1524, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), which banned private sector polygraph
testing with the exception of certain industry exemptions. Unfortunately, the 99th Congress expired
before the Senate could act on S. 1815, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). S. 1815 banned private indus-
try testing with no industry exemptions. Id.
81 H.R. 1212, 100th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1988). H.R. 1212 exempted private security services and
drug manufacturers and distributors. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 659, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 12 re-
printed in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 749, 750 [hereinafter HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT].
82 S. 1904, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee
found no evidence of validity when employers used the polygraph for pre-employment screening or
on a random basis. The Report stated:
The Committee received no reports which indicated that the . test is an accurate
indicator of deception. Instead, the existing data raises serious doubts about the validity of
such tests .... [T]here is very little research or scientific evidence to establish polygraph
test validity in large-scale screening as part of unauthorized disclosure investigations, or in
personnel security screening situations, whether they be pre-employment, preclearance, pe-
riodic or aperiodic, random, or "dragnet."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 43 (quoting OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 102).
83 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 45. The Senate found evidence of validity when polygraph
examinations are conducted in the specific incident context. See supra text accompanying note 47.
84 HousE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 81. Commentators speculated that, based on prior
statements from the Administration, President Reagan would not sign the House version. See e.g.,
Polygraph Testing in the Private Work Force: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the
House Committee on Education and Labor, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1988) (testimony of Stephen J.
Markman, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy). In addition, "[biased on the House
vote, it [did] not appear [that there were] sufficient votes in the House to override a presidential
[Vol. 65:262
NOTES
On June 27, 1988, President Reagan signed EPPA into law and it
went into effect on December 27, 1988.85 Prior to the enactment of
EPPA, there were no federal restrictions on polygraph testing in the pri-
vate sector. Under EPPA, approximately eighty-five percent of poly-
graph testing conducted by private employers "engaged in or affecting
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce"8 6 should be
eliminated.8 7 As a result, EPPA-regulated employers will now have to
rely on other methods to screen job applicants or randomly check cur-
rent employees.88
Under the Act's provisions, employers who are not exempt may not
ask employees or job applicants to take lie detector tests8 9 unless the
employer is conducting an ongoing investigation and then only if the em-
ployer follows strict guidelines. 90 In addition, employers may not take
retaliatory actions against employees who refuse to take lie detector
tests91 and may not use the results of lie detector tests as the sole basis
for adverse employment decisions. 92
If an employer violates the Act's provisions, an employee or job ap-
plicant may bring a civil action in either state or federal court and recover
such legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. 93 In addi-
tion, the Secretary of Labor may assess a penalty of up to $10,000 and
bring an action to enjoin the employer from further violations. 94
veto." Fitzpatrick, Polygraph Testing of Employees in Private Industry: A Legal Overview, 35 FED. BAR NEWS
&J. 132, 133 (1988). But the New York Times reported that the Administration found the Senate
version "more agreeable." Molotsky, Senate Votes Limit on Polygraph Use in Private Industry, N.Y. Times,
March 4, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
85 29 U.S.C.A. § 2010(a).
86 29 U.S.C.A. § 2002.
87 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A- 11 (June 28, 1988). The Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources found that "70% of tests administered are preemployment, another 15% of tests are
post-employment random, and only 15% involve polygraph examinations as part of an investigation
of a specific incident relating to the employer." SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 46.
88 The alternate testing methods include psychological honesty tests, but the efficacy of these
methods has also been debated. See, e.g., D. LYXKEN, supra note 1, at 193-203.
89 29 U.S.C.A. § 2002.
90 Id § 2006(d). See infra text accompanying notes 132-76 for a discussion of the specific inci-
dent exemption of the Act.
91 Id. § 2007(a).
92 The Act requires employers to obtain additional supporting evidence before firing or taking
other adverse employment action against an employee who failed a lie detector test. l This addi-
tional supporting evidence may be.obtained, however, by confessions or other statements made by
the examinee during the course of the examination. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 40. Polygraph
examinations often yield confessions. It has been estimated that "during polygraph examinations,
three out of four job applicants admit to theft of previous employers' property." Polygraph Control
and Civil Liberties Protection Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 142 (1977). See also D. LYKEEN, supra note 1, at 206-07.
93 The Act provides that the legal or equitable relief "includes, but [is] not limited to, employ-
ment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of lost wages and benefits." 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 2005(c)(1). Given the broad language of § 2005(c)(1), actions brought under EPPA are not sub-
ject to damage caps and plaintiffs may recover punitive damages.
94 Id. § 2005(a), (b).
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A. Statutory Exemptions
Federal, state, and local governments are exempt from the Act's cov-
erage.95 Congress exempted these employers primarily because govern-
ment employees are protected by the United States Constitution. 96 In
addition, the conferees reporting on the Act recognized that neither the
House Education and Labor Committee nor the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee had jurisdiction over the functions per-
formed by public sector employers and private contractors engaged in
intelligence and counterintelligence work.97 Therefore, policy decisions
and legislative prerogative were left to committees with appropriate ju-
risdiction and expertise. 98
The Act also does not prohibit the federal government from ad-
ministering lie detector tests to experts or consultants whose duties in-
volve national defense or security.99 Congress justified this exemption
on the basis of the "compelling governmental interest in national secur-
ity" 100 and the fact that current regulations governing the use of lie de-
tectors by these agencies are extremely stringent. For example, under
Department of Defense regulations, lie detector testing may only be used
in conjunction with an in-depth investigation and other evidence must
corroborate the test's results.10
In addition to government and national security exemptions, the Act
provides for exemptions to certain targeted industries. Under the Act,
employers who manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled sub-
stances may administer lie detector tests to either prospective or current
employees. 10 2 Private employers whose primary business consists of
providing security services, such as armored cars and security alarm sys-
tems are also exempt. 10 3 Although employers engaged in these indus-
95 The Act does not apply to the "United States Government, any State or local government, or
any political subdivision of a state or local government." Id. § 2006(a).
96 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 47 (citing Texas State Employees Union v. Texas Dep't of
Mental Health and Retardation, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 33 (October 28, 1987) (absent a compelling
governmental objective, the state's use of a polygraph violated its employees' constitutional right to
privacy)). Although the federal Constitution does not expressly provide a right to privacy, the
Supreme Court has found "zones of privacy" in the penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and
ninth amendments, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), and the personal liberty
guarantee of the fourteenth amendment, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
97 HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 81, at 12.
98 Id. The Labor and Human Resource Committee did not recommend that other committees
look into public sector polygraph testing because it found the "overwhelming evidence of [poly-
graph testing] abuse in the private sector," not in the public sector. SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at
48.
99 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(b). This exemption includes experts or consultants under contract to the
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
100 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 48.
101 Id.
102 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(o. The employer may only test a prospective employee if that employee
would have "direct access to the manufacture, storage, distribution, or sale of any such controlled
substance;...." Id. § 2006(f)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Current employees could only be tested if the
test were administered in connection with an ongoing investigation of "loss or injury to the manufac-
ture, distribution, or dispensing of any such controlled substance by such employer, and . . . the
employee had access to the person or property that is the subject of the investigation." Id.
§ 2006(f)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
103 Id. § 2006(e). The Act exempts the following security services:
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tries may use lie detectors to screen prospective employees and
randomly test current employees, the tests conducted pursuant to these
exemptions must comply with the restrictions outlined in Part II B of this
Note.
Finally, the Act provides an exemption for the investigation of spe-
cific incidents of economic loss to the employer's business. 10 4 This ex-
emption only applies, however, if the following four requirements are
met: 1) the test must be administered in "connection with an ongoing
investigation involving economic loss or injury to the employer's busi-
ness .... ,";105 2) the employee must have had access to the missing prop-
erty; 10 6 3) the employer must have a reasonable suspicion that the employee
was involved in the incident under investigation;10 7 and 4) the employer
must execute a statement which sets forth, inter alia, the details of the
incident under investigation and describes the basis for the employer's
reasonable suspicion. 0 8 As with the industry exemptions, specific inci-
dent testing may be conducted only if the situation satisfies the limita-
tions outlined below.
[Any private employer whose primary business purpose consists of providing armored
car personnel, personnel engaged in the design, installation, and maintenance of security
alarm systems, or other uniformed or plainclothes security personnel and whose function
includes protection of-
(A) facilities, materials, or operations having significant impact on the health or safety
of any State or political subdivision thereof, or the national security of the United States, as
determined by the Secretary [of Defense] ....
(B) currency, negotiable securities, precious commodities or instruments, or proprie-
tary information.
Id. The Secretary of Labor promulgated interim regulations providing that the "specific 'facilities,
materials, or operations' contemplated by this exemption include those against which acts of sabo-
tage, espionage, terrorism, or other hostile, destructive, or illegal acts could have a serious effect on
the general public's safety or health, or national security." For examples of qualifying employers,
see 53 Fed. Reg. 41,494 (1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 801) (proposed Oct. 21, 1988) [here-
inafter "Interim Regulations"].
104 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d).
105 /Id § 2006(d)(1).
106 Id. § 2006(d)(2).
107 Id. § 2006(d)(3). See infra text accompanying notes 152-61 describing the "reasonable suspi-
cion" requirement in detail.
108 Id § 2006(d)(4). Section 2006(d)(4) of the Act provides as follows:
[The employer [must] execute[] a statement, provided to the examinee before the test,
that-
(A) sets forth with particularity the specific incident or activity being investigated and
the basis for testing particular employees,
(B) is signed by a person (other than the polygraph examiner) authorized to legally
bind the employer,
(C) is retained by the employer for at least three years, and
(D) contains at a minimum-
(i) an identification of the specific economic loss or injury to the business of the
employer,
(ii) a statement indicating that the employee had access to the property that is the
subject of the investigation, and
(iii) a statement describing the basis of the employer's reasonable suspicion that the
employee was involved in the incident or activity under investigation.
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B. Restrictions on the Use of Exemptions
Congress included restrictions on exempted employers' use of
polygraphs to further decrease polygraph abuse.'0 9 The restrictions
were designed to serve three purposes: eliminate adverse employment
action based solely on lie detector results, protect employees' privacy
rights, and reduce the possibility of inaccurate test results.
The first set of restrictions, aimed at reducing unjustified adverse
employment action, treats employers who test under the specific incident
exemption differently from employers in exempt targeted industries.
Employers who test under the specific incident exemption must obtain
"additional supporting evidence" before taking adverse action against
either a prospective employee or a current employee who failed a lie de-
tector test." l0 Under the Act, admissions made by an employee either
before, during, or after a polygraph test may constitute "additional sup-
porting evidence.""' Evidence which is required for use of the specific
incident exemption may also serve as "additional supporting evi-
dence.",112 Accordingly, once the predicate requirements of the specific
incident exemption have been met,1 3 an employer may be able to take
adverse employment action on the basis of the polygraph test results or
the refusal to take a polygraph test. However, Congress failed to clarify
exactly what evidence is necessary to meet the predicate requirements of
the specific incident exemption. 114
Targeted industry employers 1 5 lose their exemption if the results of
a polygraph test or the refusal to take such a test forms the "sole basis
upon which adverse employment action ... is taken." ' 1 6 The Act, how-
ever, provides no guidance concerning what other reasons would be nec-
essary to avoid a "sole basis" determination. Apparently, any bona fide
employer reason would suffice.' 17 Therefore, this limitation provides no
real protection for current or prospective employees who are screened or
randomly tested by targeted industries. 118
109 See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
110 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(a).
11 Interim Regulations, supra note 103, at 41,504.
112 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(a)(I).
113 See infra text accompanying notes 135-61.
114 See infra text accompanying notes 135-61.
115 See supra notes 102-03 for the Act's description of exempt targeted industries.
116 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(a)(2).
117 See Interim Regulations, supra note 103, at 41,504. Examples of bona fide reasons included in
the regulations are "traditional factors such as prior employment experience, education, job per-
formance, etc." Id.
118 Consider the following hypothetical which illustrates this problem. An employee applies for a
job as a uniformed security guard to protect a nuclear power plant. As part of its application pro-
cess, the plant requires all security guard applicants to submit to a polygraph test as permitted by
§ 2006(e) of the Act. The applicant submits to and fails a polygraph test. The plant then rejects his
application and, as is typically the case, does not give the applicant an explanation of why the appli-
cation was denied. Under this scenario, the applicant would probably not recover under the Act
(even though in fact the decision may have been based solely on the polygraph test results) because,
it would be easy for the employer to give some reason that would easily fit into the broad category of
bona fide reasons and satisfy the § 2007(a)(2) requirement that the decision not be based solely on
the polygraph test results. Of course, the employer would have to give a reason that would also not
violate other state or federal laws such as Title VII in order to avoid all liability.
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The second set of restrictions, aimed at protecting employees' pri-
vacy rights, are more detailed. In a broad sense, the Act protects em-
ployees' privacy interests simply because no employee may be required
to submit to a lie detector test as a condition of employment.1 19 Examin-
ees who do submit to a test may terminate the test during any phase.1 20
Even if an employee completes a test, the test results may be disclosed
only to those individuals or entities named in the statute (the examinee;
any person designated by the examinee; the employer; or any court, gov-
ernmental agency, arbitrator, or mediator pursuant to a court order).121
In addition to the disclosure limitations, the Act limits the manner in
which examiners may ask questions and the types of questions. Section
2007(b)(1)(B) imposes an overriding limitation that questions may not
be asked "in a manner designed to degrade, or needlessly intrude" on
the examinee. In conjunction with section 2007(b)(1)(B), section
2007(b)(1) (C) specifically prohibits questions concerning religious be-
liefs, opinions regarding race, political beliefs, sexual behavior, and be-
liefs or affiliations regarding labor unions.
Finally, the Act provides that the examinee must be informed in writ-
ing whether the test will be observed through a two-way mirror, a cam-
era, or any other device. 122 If a recording or monitoring device is to be
used, the examinee must also be informed in writing. 123 Additionally,
the examinee must be informed that the test may be recorded so long as
both parties are aware of the recording.' 24
Congress designed the third set of restrictions to reduce the possi-
bility of inaccurate test results. The single-most important factor affect-
ing polygraph validity is examiner competence.' 25 To this end, the Act
requires polygraph examiners to be licensed by the state, if the state so
requires. 126 State licensing provisions are very similar to one another
and the requirements for obtaining a license may be grouped into the
following categories:
1. Age and citizenship. Minimum age requirements range from
18 to 21 years. Citizenship is usually restricted to U.S. citizens....
2. Good moral character;
119 29 U.S.C.A. § 2002(3)(A).
120 Id § 2007(b)(1)(A).
121 The Act breaks down the disclosure rules into permissible disclosure by polygraph examiners,
id § 2008(b), and permissible disclosure by employers, it. § 2008(c). The only real difference in
treatment is that an employer may disclose the test results to a governmental agency, "but only
insofar as the disclosed information is an admission of criminal conduct." Id
122 I § 2007(b)(2)(C)(i).
123 Idt § 2007(b)(2)(C)(ii).
124 Id § 2007(b)(2)(C)(iii).
125 INBAU & REID, supra note 20, at 5.
126 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(c)(1)(A). Interestingly, Senator Dan Quayle, when stating his minority
view, mis-characterized the licensing provision as requiring "federal licensing of polygraphers." See
SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 57. In fact, the provision does not require licensing of polygraph
examiners by the federal government. Instead, the provision allows for relief under the Act if a
polygraph examiner does not comply with a particular state's licensing requirements, but not all
states require licensing of polygraph examiners. See id at 59 (minority view of Senator Thurmond
stating that only 32 states have licensing requirements).
Examiners must also maintain at least a $50,000 bond or at least $50,000 in personal liability
coverage. Id. § 2007(c)(1)(B).
1990] NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
3. No convictions for felonies or crimes involving moral
turpitude;
4. Payment of a licensing fee; ...
5. Educational requirements which vary from a high school di-
ploma to a four-year college degree and special polygraph examiner
training; ...
6. Passing an oral or written test on polygraph examinations;
and
7. Experience and/or internship in polygraph testing.12 7
Currently, however, only thirty-two of the fifty states have licensing
provisions. 128
In addition to licensing requirements, the Act prohibits examiners
from conducting more than five examinations per day and requires that
each test last at least ninety minutes. 129 Congress designed this require-
ment to curb the abuse of shotgun-type examinations which typically
lasted no more than fifteen minutes.13 0 Even polygraph advocates, such
as F. Lee Bailey, recognized that polygraph examiners could not accu-
rately gauge responses when tests were administered in such short
intervals. 131
IV. Polygraph Testing Under the Specific Incident Exemption
As the overview of the Act indicates, non-exempt employers may
now conduct polygraph tests only in conjunction with ongoing investiga-
tions of specific incidents resulting in economic loss. Since this is the
only permissible context for polygraph use by non-exempt employers, it
is likely that most of the litigation arising under the Act will center on the
specific incident exemption. As a result, employers planning to conduct
polygraph tests pursuant to this exemption must consider the following
important issues:
1. Whether state law or a collective bargaining agreement contains
further restrictions on polygraph testing. 32
127 Zafran and Stickle, Polygraphs in Employment: A State Survey, 33 CLv. ST. L. REV. 751 (1984)
(citations omitted).
128 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 59 (minority view of Senator Thurmond). See generally,
Zafran and Stickle, supra note 127.
129 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(5).
130 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 43.
131 Id. at 43. In Mr. Bailey's opinion, a responsible examination would take a minimum of several
hours to complete. Id.
132 The Act provides that state laws, local laws, or collective bargaining agreements which pro-
hibit lie detector tests or which are more restrictive than the Act are not preempted. 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 2009. The Senate Report states that
[clurrently, nine states have no laws governing any aspect of employment polygraph
testing, twelve states and the District of Columbia have laws which prohibit most private
employers from requiring or requesting that a polygraph test be taken as a condition of
employment, ten states prohibit most private employers from requiring an examination but
allow employers to request such an exam, and the remaining states have enacted laws which
either license polygraph examiners or regulate the use of polygraph examinations, and in
some instances do both.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 43. For a discussion of state regulations on polygraph testing, see
Herron, Statutory Restrictions on Polygraph Testing in Employer-Employee Relationships, 1986 LAB. L.J. 632;
Zafran and Stickle, supra note 127.
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2. Whether the examinee could successfully bring -a common law
cause of action.' 33
3. Whether the chosen polygraph examiner is competent. 134
4. Whether the polygraph test results will be disclosed only to per-
sons listed in section 2008 of the Act.
5. Whether the predicate economic loss or injury, access, reason-
able suspicion, and notice requirements of the specific incident exemp-
tion have been met.
Aside from analysis of possible common law causes of action, the
most difficult issue facing the employer may be deciding whether the eco-
nomic loss, access, and reasonable suspicion requirements of the specific
incident exemption have been met. The purpose of this Part is, there-
fore, twofold: first, to provide guidance on when these predicate require-
ments have been met; and second, to suggest that courts resolve the
exemption's ambiguities in favor of employers in order to permit poly-
graph use as an investigative tool.
A. Specific Incident Requirements
1. Economic Loss or Injury
The specific incident exemption applies only to investigations of in-
cidents involving "economic loss or injury to the employer's business,
such as theft, embezzlement, misappropriation, or an act of industrial es-
pionage or sabotage," 135 but these examples are "illustrative not exhaus-
tive."1 36 Even though the legislative history of the Act indicates that the
economic loss or injury requirement is to be "narrowly construed," the
House Conference Report included examples which might even result in
a short term gain to the employer such as check-kiting, money launder-
133 It has been suggested that the Act may preempt all common law causes of action and this
point may be litigated. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 84, at 370. However, since the Act probably does
not fit within the current preemption principles outlined in Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Re-
sources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983), "employees should still be able
to pursue common-law causes of action." Fitzpatrick, supra note 84, at 370. The Supreme Court
summarized these pre-emption principles as follows:
Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress' intent to supercede state law altogether
may be found from a "scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it," because "the Act of
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject," or
because "the object sought to be obtained by federal law and the character of obligations
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose." Even where Congress has not entirely dis-
placed state regulation in a specific area, state law is preempted to the extent that it actually
conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when "compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility," or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 203-04 (citations omitted). Employees have recovered on a number of differ-
ent causes of action including public policy tort theories, breach of contract, invasion of privacy,
defamation, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress and discrimination. Fitzpatrick,
supra note 84, at 370. See also, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 24, 1983, at 1, col. I.
134 Competence in this situation not only includes meeting the licensing and bonding require-
ments of the Act, see supra note 126 and accompanying text, but also understanding and complying
with the testing requirements contained in § 2007 of the Act.
135 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d)(1).
136 Interim Regulations, supra note 103, at 41,499.
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ing, or misappropriating confidential or trade secret information. 137 In
addition, indirect losses attributable to theft from property managed by
an employer or over which the employer acts as a fiduciary or custodian
clearly fit within the requirement. 138
In contrast, the Act's interim regulations give examples of situations
that do not fit within the economic loss requirement. For example, unin-
tentional losses fall outside of the requirement. 139 Accordingly, losses to
an employer resulting from workplace accidents would not qualify.' 40
Similarly, losses suffered by an employee, as opposed to the employer,
do not meet the requirement. 14' Polygraph tests conducted to deter-
mine whether an employee used drugs or alcohol are also outside of the
exemption, despite the fact that such drug or alcohol use may have con-
tributed to an economic loss.' 42 The regulations also exclude frequent
economic losses, such as frequent inventory shortages, which are investi-
gated without evidence of intentional wrongdoing as part of ongoing in-
vestigations. 43 Finally, the regulations prohibit an employer from
conducting polygraph tests "to determine whether or not any thefts have
occurred." 144
Since the Act, its legislative history, and the interim regulations
largely define "economic loss or injury" by examples rather than specific
guidelines, the exact scope of the economic loss requirement will not be
determined until courts decide cases litigating this point. Attorneys ad-
vising their clients should carefully consider the examples contained in
the regulations and should remember that Congress intended a narrow
construction of the economic loss requirement.145
137 HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 81, at 12. See also Interim Regulations, supra note
103, at 41,500.
138 Interim Regulations, supra note 103, at 41,500.
139 Id. at 41,499.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 41,500.
142 Id. The regulations provide:
While nothing in the Act prohibits the use of medical tests to determine the presence
of controlled substances or alcohol in bodily fluids, the section 2007(d) exemption does not
permit the use of a polygraph test to learn whether an employee has used drugs or alcohol,
even where such possible use may have contributed to an economic loss to the employer
[e.g., an accident involving a company vehicle].
Id.
143 Id. at 41,499. The regulations provide that
even if the employer can establish that unusually high amounts of inventory are missing
from warehouses in a given month, this, in and of itself, would not be sufficient basis to
meet the specific incident requirement without evidence of intentional wrongdoing. Ad-
ministering a polygraph test in such circumstances ... would amount to little more than a
fishing expedition.
Id.
144 Id.
145 It has been observed that other employer losses, in particular losses due to drug trafficking on
work premises, may fit within the economic loss requirement. See 200 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 1988, at 1,
col. 1. This observation is based on the "strong public policy against drug trafficking" which should
encourage employers to use the polygraph "to help root out this insidious activity from the work-
place." Id. In contrast to polygraph testing aimed at determining whether an employee used drugs,
investigations of drug trafficking on work premises are not specifically excluded from the specific
incident exemption. Since it may be argued that drug trafficking at least indirectly injures the em-
ployer, aggressive employers may use the polygraph in this situation. Id.
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2. Access
Employees given polygraph tests under the specific incident exemp-
tion must have "had access to the property that is the subject of the in-
vestigation."' 46 Although the Act does not define the term "access," the
interim regulations explain that "access" refers to "the opportunity
which an employee had to cause, or to aid or abet in causing, the specific
economic loss or injury under investigation."' 147 This definition includes
not only those employees who had physical contact with the property
under investigation, but also those employees with the "ability to divert
possession or otherwise affect the disposition of the property."' 148
The "access" required for application of the specific incident ex-
emption must be distinguished from "direct access" which is required for
pre-employment testing by employers who manufacture, distribute, or
dispense controlled substances.' 49 In order to screen prospective em-
ployees, direct access to the controlled substance is required. An em-
ployer would meet the "direct access" requirement if he could show that
"the position being applied for has responsibilities which include contact
with or affect the disposition of a controlled substance."' 50 Thus, ac-
cording to the interim regulations, in a situation where an employee had
only "infrequent, random, or opportunistic" access, the "access" re-
quirement would be satisfied, but the "direct access" requirement would
not be met.' 5 '
3. Reasonable Suspicion
The specific incident exemption also requires that an employer have
a "reasonable suspicion that the employee was involved in the incident
or activity under investigation." 152 Once again, the statute itself does not
define the phrase and its varying usage in different contexts has led to
speculation that its meaning "may be the most complex issue posed by,
and ultimately litigated under the Act." 15
The Act's legislative history shows that Congress intended "reason-
able suspicion" to refer "to some observable, articulable basis in fact be-
yond predicate loss and access required for any testing. This could
146 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d)(2).
147 Interim Regulations, supra note 103, at 41,500.
148 1d As a demonstration of direct or physical contact, the regulations provide that "all employ-
ees working in or with authority to enter a warehouse storage area have 'access' to the property in
the warehouse." lId
The "ability to affect the disposition of the property" would be satisfied where "[tor example, a
bookkeeper in ajewelry store with access to inventory records may aid and abet a clerk who steals an
expensive watch by removing the watch from the employer's inventory records." Id.
149 See supra text accompanying note 102.
150 Interim Regulations, supra note 103, at 41,501.
151 The interim regulations -equate the "access" required in § 2006(f)(2)(b)(access required for
ongoing investigation testing by employers who manufacture, distribute or dispense controlled sub-
stances), with the "access" required in § 2006(d)(2)(access required for specific incident testing by
non-exempt employers). Id Accordingly, since the interim regulations provide that § 2006(f)(2)(b)
"access" may be met with only "infrequent, random, or opportunistic" contact, such contact should
be sufficient to meet the "access" requirement of § 2006(d)(2). See id. for further examples illustrat-
ing the difference between "access" and "direct access."
152 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d)(3).
153 Fitzpatrick, supra note 84, at 370.
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include such factors as the demeanor of the employee or discrepancies
which arise during the course of an investigation."1 54 Although the "ar-
ticulable basis in fact" language parallels guidance from cases interpret-
ing "reasonable suspicion" as required by the fourth amendment in
certain search and seizure situations, 55 Congress clearly did not intend
courts to construe the Act's "reasonable suspicion" requirement as
strictly as it has been construed under the fourth amendment. The legis-
lative history expressly provides that "the standards contained in [the]
legislation are not as stringent as those afforded criminal subjects."' 156
Therefore, in cases where the state has met the fourth amendment's
"reasonable suspicion" requirement, employers have clearly met the
Act's requirement. 57
Even in factual situations where courts have split on whether the
fourth amendment standard has been satisfied, such as in cases based
solely on accusations by fellow employees,158 courts interpreting the Act
will probably find that the "reasonable suspicion" requirement has been
met. The interim regulations support this position by stating that
"[i]nformation from a co-worker, or an employee's behavior, demeanor,
154 HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 81, at 13. Congress further provided that "while
access alone does not constitute a basis for reasonable suspicion, the totality of circumstances sur-
rounding such access, such as its unauthorized or unusual nature, may constitute an additional fac-
tor." Id. The interim regulations give the following example to illustrate this point:
[I]n an investigation of a theft of an expensive piece ofjewelry, an employee authorized to
open the establishment's safe no earlier than 9:00 a.m., in order to place the jewelry in a
window display case, is observed opening the safe at 7:30 a.m. In such a situation, the
opening of the safe by the employee one and one-half hours prior to the specified time may
serve as the basis for reasonable suspicion. On the other hand, in the example given, if the
employer asked the employee to bring the piece ofjewelry to his or her office at 7:30, and
the employee then opened the safe and reported the jewelry missing, such access, standing
alone, would not constitute a basis for reasonable suspicion that the employee was involved
in the incident.
Interim Regulations, supra note 103, at 41,500.
155 The fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures requires
"reasonable suspicion" before the state conducts searches in two contexts-first, in relation to stop
and frisk searches, see, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (officer did not have articulable
basis to think that suspect was armed); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) (defendant's urging
of confederates to leave and strange movements in an attempt to evade officers constituted articul-
able basis for brief detention); United States v. Malone, 886 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1989) (the facts that
the defendant fit the "gang profile," carried only a shoe bag for a three day trip, could not name
anyone in the city to verify his identity, and could not explain his presence in the city constituted an
articulable basis to suspect him of transporting illegal drugs); United States v. Taylor, 857 F.2d 210
(4th Cir. 1988) (search warrant based on probable cause that defendants were drug dealers and the
fact that the defendant stored heroine in his residence gave articulable basis for stopping defend-
ant's vehicle leaving defendant's residence), and second, in cases of drug testing by public employ-
ers, see, e.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987)(reasonable inference that an
employee is under the influence of drugs may be drawn from behavior) and cases cited infra note
158.
156 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 48-49.
157 See, e.g., cases meeting the requirement cited supra note 155 and infra note 158.
158 See, e.g., Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't., 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1988)(accusation by
co-workers gives rise to reasonable suspicion sufficient to order drug testing of police officer); Ever-
ett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1987)(fireman's statement made to co-worker gives rise to
reasonable suspicion sufficient to order drug testing); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482
(N.D.Ga. 1985) (reasonable suspicion satisfied on the basis of informer's observations). But compare,
Hunter v. Anger, 672 F.2d 668 (11 th Cir. 1982) (anonymous tip did not meet reasonable suspicion
requirement to search prison visitors).
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or conduct may be factors in the basis for reasonable suspicion."' 5 9 In
addition, "inconsistencies between facts, claims, or statements that surface
during an investigation can serve as a sufficient basis for reasonable sus-
picion." 160 Finally, the interim regulations state that "[tihe identity of a
co-worker or other individual providing information used to establish reasonable sus-
picion need not be revealed in the statement."1 61 Based on these sec-
tions, even accusations by outsiders or anonymous informants may be
sufficient to establish "reasonable suspicion" under the Act.
B. Construction of the Specific Incident Requirements
Since the Act's requirements for specific incident testing are numer-
ous and often ambiguous, employers may be discouraged from ever us-
ing the polygraph in the specific incident context.1 62 Such reluctance
would be detrimental to important interests of both employees and em-
ployers. First, innocent employees would not be able to use the poly-
graph to clear themselves of wrongful accusations. 163 Second, employers
would not be able to legitimately use the threat of a polygraph examina-
tion as a deterrent to employee theft. 164 In order to protect these inter-
ests, courts should give employers greater latitude for use of polygraph
testing by broadly construing the specific incident exemption.
The argument in favor of broad construction is supported by the fact
that specific incident polygraph testing may act as an additional safe-
guard against the unjust firing of employees terminable at-will. Many
employees who will be tested under the exemption are at-will employ-
ees. 165 The general rule with respect to these employees is that an em-
ployer may terminate them whenever and for whatever cause he chooses
without incurring liability. 166 Although there are exceptions to this rule,
such as an implied contractual duty not to discharge for reasons violative
of public policy, 167 these exceptions would not prohibit an employer
from firing an innocent employee whom the employer suspects may have
been involved in some incident of wrongdoing. If courts narrowly con-
159 Interim Regulations, supra note 103, at 41,500.
160 Id.
161 Id. (emphasis added).
162 See Christopher, The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 25 GA. ST. B.J. 174 (1989). See
also, 134 CONG. REC. H3730 (daily ed. June 6, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Livingston and Bartlett).
163 Pursuant to 29 U.S.C.A. § 2005(d), an employee would not even be able to waive the Act's
requirements and consent to a polygraph test in order to exonerate himself.
164 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 46.
165 Most collective bargaining agreements contain prohibitions on lie detector testing. See SEN-
ATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 56 (minority views of Sen. Quayle). These employees could not be
tested under the specific incident exemption since the Act does not preempt collective bargaining
agreements that are more restrictive. See supra note 132.
166 Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that Employer May Discharge At-will Employee for Any Reason, 12
A.L.R. 4TH 544 (1982).
167 In these cases, the employee is required to show that the employer acted in bad faith. Most of
these cases have failed, however, because the court is either unwilling to depart from the general
rule or there has been an insufficient bad faith showing. Id. at 550. For cases recognizing the excep-
tion, see, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D.Pa. 1979) (antitrust laws state a
public policy limiting the employer's contractual right to terminate at-will employment because of
the employee's refusal.to violate such laws); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d
549 (1974) (breach of an employment contract when an employee's termination is motivated by bad
faith, malice, or retaliation); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980)
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strue the exemption, employers who would otherwise conduct polygraph
tests may not do so in the future and may, therefore, fire at-will employ-
ees solely on the basis of their suspicions.
Broad construction of the exemption is also supported by the useful-
ness of the polygraph in combatting employee theft. As noted above, the
threat of a polygraph test may deter employee theft. In addition, many
employees who are given polygraph tests confess to crimes during the
course of the examination.168
Research also indicates that the polygraph is a fairly accurate lie de-
tector when used in the specific incident context.169 Polygraph adversa-
ries often cite validity studies to show that the polygraph should be
banned from the workplace. A sample of these studies shows polygraph
validity percentages range from thirty-four percent to ninety-two per-
cent.' 70 However, the validity of the lie detector, i.e., the lie detector's
ability to accurately detect honesty or dishonesty, should not be the pri-
mary focus in determining whether polygraphs should be used in the
workplace. Instead, a "fairness" approach, which evaluates the poly-
graph on the basis of the percentage of cases where a polygraph test
would not result in an unjustified adverse employment decision, i.e.,
where the polygraph would not yield a false positive, should be used.
A "fairness" approach recognizes that when a polygraph is adminis-
tered, there are three possible results-either the test is accurate, incon-
clusive, or inaccurate (false positive or false negative). Only in the case
of a false positive would the polygraph lead an employer to an unjustified
employment decision. If the test is accurate, the employer would bejus-
tified in either firing or not firing the employee on the basis of the test
results. If the test is inconclusive, the employer should either re-test the
employee or take no employment action on the basis of the test. If the
test resulted in a false negative, the employee would certainly suffer no
injustice. In fact, the employee would receive a windfall in the sense that
he or she lied during the examination, but tested as though telling the
truth. Therefore, from the employees' perspective, it would be fair to
use the polygraph in approximately eighty-seven to ninety-nine percent
of employer investigations. '7'
(breach of an implied provision that an employer will not discharge an employee for refusing to
perform an act violative of public policy).
Another exception to the general rule that has been recognized by some courts can be found in
suits that are tortious in nature for retaliatory discharge based on dismissal for reasons violative of
public policy. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164
Cal.Rptr. 839 (1980) (rejecting an employer's contention that an employee who alleged that he was
fired because of his refusal to participate in the employer's price-fixing scheme was confined to a
contract cause of action); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (employee
has a cause of action for retaliatory discharge when an employer fires the employee in order to
prevent the employee from asserting his statutory worker's compensation rights).
For a general discussion of these and other exceptions to the general rule with respect to dis-
charge of at-will employees, see id.
168 See supra note 92.
169 See supra text accompanying notes 47-79.
170 See supra table accompanying notes 56-70.
171 See supra table accompanying notes 56-70.
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Given the Act's objective of increasing the accuracy of polygraphs
conducted in the workplace,1 72 polygraph tests conducted pursuant to
these requirements should fairly distinguish guilty from innocent em-
ployees. Employers and employees each have an interest in making this
distinction. Employers hope to avoid the costs of continued employee
theft by recidivists and the recruiting and training costs for new employ-
ees which may be avoided if honest employees are able to exonerate
themselves. Employees have an obvious interest in job security which
may be severely threatened if employers no longer conduct polygraph
tests, but dismiss or take other adverse employment action solely on the
basis of suspicion. Broad construction of the specific incident exemption
would encourage employers to take the extra step of polygraph testing to
confirm or deny their suspicions.
The Act's legislative history provides an example which, although
not used to demonstrate this point, illustrates the potential problem if
employers no longer conduct polygraph tests in connection with specific
incident investigations. 73 In the example, employers suspected 1,000
employees of theft174 and gave them polygraph examinations. Assuming
a ninety-five percent accuracy rate, 175 examiners would wrongfully label
fifty innocent examinees deceptive and presumably fire them. Although
this seems like a harsh result, consider the results if the employers had
not conducted polygraph examinations. Assuming the employees were
at-will employees, the employers could have taken adverse employment
action, solely on the basis of the employer's "reasonable suspicion."' 176
If half (500) the employees were in fact guilty, the employers would have
wrongfully labeled the other half (500) of the employees (an additional
450 employees) deceptive and taken adverse employment action as a re-
sult. Both employers as well as employees unnecessarily suffer from this
result because of the added recruiting and training costs and the costs
associated with the lowered morale of the remaining employees who
would resent the firing of innocent employees and might fear the same
fate.
V. Conclusion
Congress passed EPPA considering the interests of both employers
and employees. Under EPPA, non-exempt employers may no longer
conduct polygraph tests in the least accurate contexts-pre-employment
screening and random testing. Employers may, however, use the poly-
graph to investigate specific incidents of economic loss, where the poly-
graph has shown some evidence of validity.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 125-31.
173 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 42.
174 For purposes of this example, it is assumed that the predicate testing requirements, including
"reasonable suspicion," have been met.
175 The report characterized this percentage as "extraordinary," but the figures presented in the
OTA Report show that this figure is not too high. See id. at 42 and supra tables accompanying notes
56-76.
176 See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
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The requirements for testing under the specific incident exemption
are numerous and often ambiguous. Employers planning to conduct
tests under this exemption must first determine whether a state statute or
a collective bargaining agreement preempts the Act's coverage. If the
Act has not been preempted, then the employer must gain a thorough
understanding of the procedural requirements of the Act, and carefully
consider whether the predicate testing requirements have been met. In
particular, the employer must determine whether the facts of the investi-
gation satisfy the "articulable basis in fadt" standard of "reasonable
suspicion."
Finally, courts must broadly construe the specific incident exemp-
tion. Narrow construction would discourage employers from using the
polygraph as an investigative tool. If employers no longer conduct poly-
graph tests, at-will employees will be deprived of an opportunity to use
the polygraph to exonerate themselves if suspected of wrongdoing. Em-
ployers will also not be able to legitimately use the threat of a polygraph
examination as a deterrent to the widespread problem of employee theft.
Accordingly, broad construction would, consistent with the Act's pur-
pose, serve the interests of both employers and employees.
Charles P. Cullen
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